1 that the price we pay is the smothering of debate. Hedges learned this firsthand, when he shared with his audience his profound doubts about warfare and its effects on the civil voice in a college commencement address in spring 2003, just after the initial stage of the most recent war with Iraq had ended-and was promptly booed from the stage.
Given this, the only meaningful time to debate the need for war is before one begins; it is too late once it is under way. History is abundantly clear that the myth of war, once a war starts, has a power to overwhelm culture and public discourse, and therefore takes over thought to an extraordinary degree.
The second key proposition here is that the press is the only institution that can reasonably be expected to make possible a robust debate over foreign policy, in general, and the war option, in particular, in a timely enough way to make a difference in the choices made by policy elites. At least in theory, news-gathering organizations have the resources, both human and material, and the philosophic mission to investigate claims to truth by the state about the need for war, and are unfettered by either external government controls or (again, in theory) the concerns of partisan politics that limit other institutions, particularly Congress.
The general public, by contrast, has neither the inclination nor the wherewithal, for the most part, to open a genuinely serious debate on its own. At the same time, neither nonmainstream media (e.g., public broadcasting, quality periodicals such as The New Yorker or small circulation opinion journals such as The Nation, the Internet, and so on) nor nonelite dissenting groups, think tanks, or academic specialists alone or in combination are sufficient for the task of creating a critical mass of doubt about official Washington's analysis sans questions about the policy options raised in the mainstream news media. To be sure, if a war goes on long enough, as did the Vietnam War, or a conflict is sustained at an obviously increasing cost and seems to have derailed, as is now the case of the American occupation of Iraq, the public can become alarmed and, eventually, a free-swinging debate can open up-but this almost always occurs long after terrible damage has been done. It is in this regard that a debate following a war is a case of too little far too late.
It was during the run-up to the war with Iraq that an authentic debate mattered most, the most critical time for a national discussion in which all sides could have had equal voice. Yet, as I hope to make plain, the press for a range of reasons failed to function, as democratic theory promises, and its passivity helped contribute to what arguably is a foreign policy fiasco of an unusual dimension.
The Press and an Ill-Informed Public
Never before in the annals of contemporary American foreign policy was so much evidence accumulated so quickly that the assumptions leading to a war were so questionable. Almost as soon as the president declared victory, the chaos and daily violence began on the ground in post-invasion Iraq and the failure of the U.S. military to find Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) quickly became an embarrassment. Added to the mix, as time passed, were the final reports of David Kay, the administration's chief weapons inspector, the insider account of Richard Clarke, onetime White House's staff expert on terrorism, and the reports of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the 9/11 commission. The only matter left in dispute by the summer of 2004 was whether President Bush and his advisors had knowingly misled Congress and the American people about the reasons for going to war.
As to how the press figures into all of this, the chain of logic is simple. Under democratic theory, a privately owned press unrestrained by government
